Supreme Court Justice Chandran Dissents on Relaxing Judicial Practice Requirement
In a significant development, Justice K Vinod Chandran of the Supreme Court expressed his dissent against the modification of the mandated three-year law practice requirement for appointments as civil judges in India. This dissent came in response to a ruling by a bench comprising Chief Justice of India (CJI) Surya Kant and Justices Augustine George Masih and K Vinod Chandran, concerning the case Bhumika Trust v. Union of India and Others.
The decision revises a 2025 Supreme Court verdict that required aspiring civil judges to have three years of practice before entering judicial service. The new ruling, effective April 2027, demands only one year of law practice, followed by a year of intensive judicial training at the State Judicial Academy and six months of clerkship at the district and High Courts.
However, Justice Chandran stood firm in his belief that the original three-year practice requirement is crucial for developing competent jurists. He emphasized that this experience is vital for young law graduates to understand the complexities of legal practice and the challenges faced by litigants.
Justice Chandran remarked, “I am of the definite opinion that experience at the Bar is essential for students right out of college; steeped in academics, who should have a feel of the affairs of man and the travails of a litigant, before deciding their destinies.” He argued that the absence of such experience could result in careerists rather than capable jurists who contribute meaningfully to the justice system.
In his dissent, Justice Chandran raised concerns about entrusting fresh graduates with decision-making responsibilities, pointing out that even seasoned lawyers require years of practice to attain proficiency in drafting, research, and argument formulation. He also highlighted the crucial role of interactions with senior lawyers and peers in shaping the careers of young lawyers.
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Furthermore, Justice Chandran expressed reservations about the structured training regime proposed by the court. He warned that it might deter academically proficient students, as the training period would not offer full pay, nor would it count as service. He noted that this could lead to courts being understaffed and vacancies remaining unfilled.
Justice Chandran also critiqued the requirement for evaluation by a High Court judge, suggesting that it could create hurdles in transitioning from training to active service. He observed that the new system might lead to inequality among recruits, as those with varying years of practice would undergo the same training regime.
The dissent underscores a broader debate within the judiciary on balancing academic qualifications and practical experience in judicial appointments. As the legal community examines the implications of this ruling, the emphasis remains on ensuring a robust and competent judiciary capable of delivering justice effectively.
