The Tribunals Reforms Act, 2026, marks the fourth legislative effort by the Indian government to reform the tribunal system in a manner consistent with Supreme Court guidelines. This initiative emerges from the need to alleviate the significant backlog of cases in Indian courts, a responsibility that the Union government shares as both a major contributor to this backlog and a potential solution provider.
Historical Context of Tribunalisation
The concept of tribunalisation in India took root with the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, allowing for the establishment of administrative tribunals to address disputes in government services. This was followed by the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, which created the Central Administrative Tribunal and other state-level counterparts. Initially, these tribunals offered a direct appeal route to the Supreme Court, bypassing High Courts entirely.
However, this framework was challenged in the Supreme Court. In SP Sampath Kumar v. Union of India (1987), the Court ruled that tribunals could replace High Courts only if they provided the same level of judicial independence. A decade later, in L Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997), a seven-judge bench reiterated that judicial review under Articles 226, 227, and 32 is integral to the Constitution’s basic structure, mandating High Court oversight of tribunal decisions.
Challenges and Reforms
Despite the proliferation of subject-specific tribunals in response to India’s growing economy, there was a lack of a unified framework for staffing these bodies. The Law Commission’s 272nd Report (2017) highlighted this inconsistency and recommended standardization. The government’s initial response, Part XIV of the Finance Act, 2017, attempted to consolidate tribunals and vested appointment powers in the Centre through Section 184.
This section became contentious, leading to four Supreme Court judgments. In Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd. (2019), the Court invalidated the 2017 Rules due to the executive-heavy selection committees. The Court further directed the creation of an independent National Tribunals Commission in Madras Bar Association v. Union of India (2020), and criticized the four-year tenure for tribunal members. Subsequent rulings in 2021 and 2025 continued to strike down similar legislative attempts that failed to rectify these issues.
The Tribunals Reforms Act, 2026: Progress and Limitations
With the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2026, the government has made notable improvements. The tenure for tribunal members has been extended to five years, the selection committee’s process has been refined to recommend one candidate plus an alternate, and the age floor of fifty years has been removed. The Act also establishes the National Tribunals Commission, incorporating a retired judge as Chairperson, alongside judicial and technical members.
Despite these advancements, concerns persist. The executive branch retains considerable influence in selecting tribunal members, as technical members are not appointed in consultation with the Chief Justice of India and hold voting rights in selection committees. Furthermore, initial disciplinary reviews of tribunal members remain within the purview of the administering Ministry.
Additionally, key aspects of the Act, such as qualifications and service conditions for members, await further rule-making. Until these rules are finalized, the full impact of the Act remains speculative.
Conclusion
While the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2026, meets several specific Supreme Court directives, whether it fulfills the broader constitutional principle of ensuring tribunal independence from executive control remains uncertain. The government has made strides, yet the balance between legislative design and judicial tenets of independence continues to be a delicate one.
About the author: Jai Raina is a Senior Associate at AP & Partners.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Bar & Bench.
