Supreme Court Quashes FIR Under Section 69 BNS
In a significant ruling, the Supreme Court of India, through a bench comprising Justices JB Pardiwala and K Vinod Chandran, set aside a First Information Report (FIR) filed under Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS). This legal provision criminalizes sexual relations obtained deceitfully, such as through a false promise of marriage.
The Case and Its Implications
The case involved a complainant who accused a man of engaging in a physical relationship with her under the assurance of marriage. However, the man later withdrew from this promise, citing his mother’s objection to their union. The Supreme Court held that this reasoning demonstrated the promise was originally made with genuine intent, thus no deceit, as per Section 69, was involved.
Examining the Court’s Reasoning
While the court’s decision may be justifiable based on the facts presented, its reasoning raises concerns. The ruling potentially offers a convenient defense for those accused under Section 69: they could claim parental disapproval as a reason for not fulfilling a marriage promise, thereby evading accountability.
The Framework of Section 69
Section 69 was established to address conduct that, while not amounting to rape, involves obtaining consent through deceit, such as a false promise of marriage. The legal test, as shaped by previous cases like Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana and Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, necessitates proving that the promise was false from the outset and influenced the complainant’s consent.
Challenges in the Court’s Approach
The issue lies not in the legal test itself but in the ease with which “family opposition” is seen as proof of good faith. Typically, an adult making a promise of marriage would be aware of their family’s likely reaction. If they fail to confirm family consent beforehand, any resultant opposition should not be treated as an unavoidable circumstance.
The Constitutional and Practical Dimensions
The reasoning neglects the constitutional right to choose one’s spouse, a facet of personal liberty under Article 21. An accused could marry despite family objections, so citing parental disapproval as an excuse reflects personal choice rather than an external constraint. This perspective risks creating a defense mechanism that is easy to assert and hard to disprove, undermining the intent of Section 69.
Case-Specific Observations
In this instance, the initial intimacy was not based on a marriage promise, according to the complainant’s own account. The promise emerged during the relationship, which does not meet Section 69’s criteria, focused on deceit at the point of initial consent. Thus, the court could have relied solely on this aspect rather than parental objection in reaching its verdict.
Conclusion: A Precedent with Broad Implications
While this judgment alone does not dismantle Section 69, it sets a precedent that could influence future cases. Courts may now cite this decision to argue that a broken promise due to parental objection is inherently made in good faith. Such a stance needs more rigorous examination, questioning the accused’s efforts to fulfill their promise prior to invoking family opposition.
Aditya Mishra, an advocate practicing in Delhi, contributed to this analysis.
