Supreme Court Declines PIL on Minority Educational Institutions

The Supreme Court of India recently declined to entertain a public interest litigation (PIL) that sought regulatory measures for all educational institutions, including those providing secular and religious education to children up to the age of 14. The PIL was filed by Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay, a BJP leader and advocate, who claimed that certain minority educational institutions are engaging in activities that could potentially radicalize young children.

The petitioner argued that a number of semi-religious minority institutions, operating under the protections afforded by Article 30 of the Indian Constitution, are misinterpreting the law. Article 30 allows minorities to establish and manage educational institutions. Upadhyay contended that these institutions are not subject to adequate state oversight, resulting in the radicalization of vulnerable youth and impacting national security and unity.

Presiding over the matter, a bench comprising Justices Aravind Kumar and Vipul Pancholi decided not to proceed with the PIL. In response to the bench’s decision, Upadhyay opted to withdraw the petition.

“Imparting religious instruction indirectly promotes religion,” Upadhyay asserted during the proceedings. The bench countered, noting that it is not permissible to file successive writ petitions on the same issue. Consequently, Upadhyay expressed his intention to explore alternative legal remedies.

The PIL also sought a judicial declaration that Article 30 should be interpreted as a specific iteration of Article 19(1)(g), which guarantees the freedom to practice any profession or carry on any trade or business. According to Upadhyay, Article 30 should not offer advantages beyond those accorded by Article 19(1)(g). Furthermore, the petitioner suggested that the phrase “educational institutions of their choice” in Article 30 should be understood to mean “secular or professional educational institutions,” and not necessarily religious ones.

Upadhyay argued that institutions providing religious education should be classified under Article 26, which concerns the freedom to manage religious affairs, rather than Article 30. His petition posited that imparting religious instruction constitutes promoting religion, thereby falling under Article 25, which deals with the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice, and propagate religion.

Ultimately, the court’s decision highlights the complexities involved in interpreting constitutional protections for minority educational institutions, as well as the balance between religious instruction and secular oversight.