AI-Created Works Eligible for Copyright, But AI Itself Cannot Be Author: Indian Copyright Office

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AI-Created Works Eligible for Copyright, But AI Itself Cannot Be Author: Indian Copyright Office

AI-Created Works Eligible for Copyright, But AI Itself Cannot Be Author: Indian Copyright Office

In a landmark ruling, the Indian Copyright Office has declared that an artificial intelligence (AI) system cannot be recognized as an author under the Copyright Act of 1957. The decision emerged from an application submitted by American computer scientist Stephen L. Thaler, who sought copyright registration for an artwork titled ‘A Recent Entrance to Paradise,’ with the AI system DABUS named as its author.

Registrar of Copyrights, Dr. Unnat P. Pandit, clarified that while AI-generated works could meet the originality criteria necessary for copyright protection, the AI system itself could not be acknowledged as the author. According to the Registrar, Thaler was the individual who initiated the creation of the artwork within the framework of Section 2(d)(vi) of the Act, rather than DABUS.

The application identified the Device for the Autonomous Bootstrapping of Unified Sentience (DABUS) as the creator and Thaler as the copyright holder. However, the Copyright Office concluded that DABUS, not being a natural or juristic person, could not be recognized as an author under Section 2(d)(vi), which designates the author of a computer-generated work as ‘the person who causes the work to be created.’

Thaler argued that DABUS autonomously generated the artwork after being trained with photographs, curated thesaurus entries, and English sentences provided by him. He stated that while he designed and configured the system, DABUS executed the creative process and produced the final visual expression independently, without ongoing human input or text prompts.

The Copyright Office refuted the argument that the entity executing the computational process should be deemed the author. It highlighted that DABUS did not independently design its architecture, select its training methods, or provide its inputs—tasks all completed by Thaler. The Registrar observed, ‘Autonomy in execution is not synonymous with the conception of a work.’

The ruling emphasized that copyright law acknowledges the ‘mastermind’ behind a creation rather than the autonomy of the tool used to produce it. The Registrar noted, ‘The law recognizes the mastermind behind the creation of the work, not the autonomy of the tool through which that creation is implemented.’

Furthermore, the Copyright Office dismissed comparisons between DABUS and entities like companies or Hindu idols, which may hold juristic person status in law. The ruling stated that DABUS lacked statutory recognition, proprietary status, civil personality, or legal capacity independent of its creator.

Despite this, the Registrar acknowledged that the artwork satisfied the originality requirement of Section 13 of the Copyright Act, noting that the composition did not replicate any identifiable pre-existing work and demonstrated a unique arrangement of colors, visual forms, tonal variations, and spatial elements. ‘The fact that the work was generated through algorithmic or computational processes cannot, by itself, render the resulting expression unoriginal,’ the order elaborated.

The Registrar also explained that originality and authorship involve distinct considerations. While a computer-generated work may possess independent creative expression, its legal authorship must be attributed to a legally recognized individual.

Thaler’s application was ultimately rejected because he persisted in naming DABUS as the author, despite being given the opportunity to amend the application. Thaler proposed that he could be identified as the author if DABUS were officially recognized as the technological generator; however, the Registrar declined to treat this as an amendment.

The Copyright Office also found inconsistencies in Thaler’s claims that identified DABUS as the author and himself as the owner, conflicting with Sections 17 to 19 of the Act. Since DABUS had no legal personality, it could neither own nor transfer copyright to Thaler.

The order clarified that this rejection does not preclude Thaler from pursuing remedies based on corrected details that identify a legally recognized author and substantiate ownership. Legal assistance for the Copyright Office was provided by Senior Advocate Rajeshwari Hariharan, with Thaler represented by advocates Ankit Sahni, Chirag Ahluwalia, Aman Sinha, and Goldie Dhama, along with Ryan Abbott from Brown, Neri, Smith & Khan, LLP.

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