The recent legal proceedings involving Sanjay Bhandari in the Delhi High Court have reignited a critical constitutional debate: should individuals who evade the jurisdiction of Indian courts be allowed to seek protection under those same courts? This question takes on particular significance with the application of Section 14 of the Fugitive Economic Offenders (FEO) Act, 2018. This section empowers courts and tribunals to prevent a declared fugitive economic offender from pursuing or defending civil claims within India.
Access to Justice vs. Judicial Authority
The conflict is a complex constitutional issue. On one side, access to justice is a fundamental right under Articles 14 and 21 of the Indian Constitution. On the other, the legal framework expects individuals to respect and comply with the judicial process. The FEO Act aims to balance the right to legal remedies with the need to uphold the authority and effectiveness of courts.
Constitutional Rights and Responsibilities
Access to justice is recognized as a part of the right to life under Article 21, as affirmed by the Supreme Court in Anita Kushwaha v. Pushap Sudan. Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer emphasized that access to justice is fundamental to human rights, and without it, constitutional promises remain unfulfilled. Indian jurisprudence consistently seeks to expand justice through principles like the presumption of innocence and ubi jus ibi remedium, ensuring enforceable remedies accompany legal rights.
However, constitutional rights come with responsibilities. A functional legal system cannot sustain itself if litigants selectively use judicial remedies while refusing to adhere to the judicial process.
Economic Offenders and Judicial Discipline
This tension is evident in cases involving economic offences. Unlike ordinary defendants, fugitive economic offenders often have the financial means to relocate assets and extend proceedings through international litigation. Delays in such cases can hinder investigations, weaken asset recovery, and undermine public confidence in financial regulation and criminal enforcement institutions.
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The FEO Act, enacted in 2018, addresses these challenges. According to its Statement of Objects and Reasons, the legislature recognized that many economic offenders flee Indian jurisdiction anticipating or during criminal proceedings. Thus, the act was designed to supplement existing civil and criminal laws. Under the statute, a person may be declared a fugitive economic offender if certain conditions are met, including an arrest warrant for a scheduled offence involving over ₹100 crore and a refusal to return to India. [See Section 2(1)(a), 2(1)(m), and 4, FEO Act.] Once declared, the individual faces severe consequences, such as being barred from pursuing civil remedies. [See Section 14, FEO Act.]
Delhi High Court’s Landmark Decision
In the context of these provisions, the Delhi High Court’s order dated April 24, 2026, in Sanjay Bhandari v. Directorate of Enforcement, marks a significant precedent. The court, for the first time, relied on Section 14(a) to deny an appeal, establishing that fugitive economic offenders cannot pursue or defend civil claims. This is in alignment with a previous decision on April 9, 2026, where the High Court dismissed a statutory appeal challenging a July 2025 judgment that declared Sanjay Bhandari a fugitive economic offender.
Constitutional Complexity and Proportionality
The issue is constitutionally complex. Critics argue that disentitlement provisions might create procedural exclusion, contradicting Article 21’s broad access to justice. However, Section 14 of the FEO Act reflects a legislative intent to prevent the misuse of the civil adjudicatory process by fugitives. The principle is that justice cannot function effectively unless litigants submit to the law’s authority.
This raises questions of proportionality. While preventing economic offenders from obstructing investigations is a legitimate state interest, a complete bar on civil remedies could be excessive in some instances. Comparative jurisprudence, such as the U.S. Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine, similarly restricts judicial access for absconders, suggesting a broader international approach to such situations.
Section 14 of the Indian statute is more categorical compared to the discretionary American model. It signifies a stricter institutional response to economic fugitivity, especially given the complexities of cross-border financial crimes. Indian courts have long refused relief to litigants abusing judicial processes, a principle echoed in Dalip Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, where the Supreme Court condemned dishonest conduct in the judicial process.
Section 14 is thus regulatory, not punitive, aiming to uphold judicial authority against those evading jurisdiction. It ensures that constitutional rights are not used to undermine constitutional governance. While access to justice is a core democratic principle, it relies equally on respect for legal authority. Ultimately, the majesty of law lies not only in recognizing rights but also in exercising them within legal discipline.
Mayank Makhija is an Assistant Legal Advisor & Special Public Prosecutor for the Directorate of Enforcement. Naman Sharma is a student at Maharashtra National Law University, Nagpur. Views are personal.
