Background of the Prakash Singh Judgment
In 1996, two former Directors General of Police, Prakash Singh and NK Singh, along with the organization Common Cause, filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in the Supreme Court of India. This PIL aimed to initiate critical police reforms throughout the States and Union Territories of India. After extensive deliberations, the Supreme Court issued a landmark judgment on September 22, 2006, outlining seven crucial directives. These directives form the foundation of police reform in India, as established in the Prakash Singh v. Union of India case.
The directives included the establishment of a State Security Commission (SSC) as recommended by the National Human Rights Commission, the appointment of a Director General of Police (DGP) from the three senior-most officers by the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) with a minimum tenure of two years, and a similar tenure for other police officers. Furthermore, the directives called for the separation of police investigation from law and order duties, the creation of a Police Establishment Board (PEB), the formation of police complaints authorities (PCAs) at the state level, and the establishment of a National Security Commission at the Union level.
Current Compliance Status
Despite the clear directives, compliance across States and Union Territories has been partial at best. This has been highlighted by both the expert committee led by Justice KT Thomas, appointed by the Supreme Court, and studies conducted by the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI). The findings indicate a concerning trend of selective compliance and dilution of the Supreme Court’s directives.
Even after two decades, the implementation of these reforms remains inadequate. The executive inertia has led to a situation where rights are granted without a remedy, necessitating the Supreme Court to issue interlocutory orders to counteract executive actions that violate court orders. Consequently, numerous contempt petitions are pending, contributing to the backlog in the apex court.
Legal Implications and Continuing Mandamus
According to Article 142(1) of the Indian Constitution, Supreme Court orders are the ‘law of the land’ until superseded by specific legislation. The Prakash Singh directives, therefore, possess the force of law. Non-compliance amounts to a violation of the law, and continuing mandamus serves as a judicial mechanism to ensure ongoing litigation and compliance monitoring through regular hearings.
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Although executive non-compliance often goes unchecked, the courts have intervened with interlocutory orders under the doctrine of continuing mandamus. This intervention has resulted in over ten formal contempt petitions and 150 interlocutory applications since 2007, with proceedings still pending.
State Defenses and Their Limitations
States have offered three primary defenses against full implementation: federalism, resource constraints, and phased compliance. The federalism argument posits that policing is a state subject, but it overlooks the fact that the court’s directives aim to fill legislative gaps. The resource constraint defense is considered more substantial, yet the Supreme Court has consistently ruled that fiscal limitations cannot excuse non-compliance, as seen in cases like Municipal Council, Ratlam v. Vardhichand (1980) and Swaraj Abhiyan v. Union of India (2016).
The phased compliance argument, while reasonable in principle, often results in indefinite delays. Without a time-bound and enforced timeline, phased compliance becomes indistinguishable from non-compliance.
The Argument for Contempt of Court
Under Section 2(a) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, civil contempt arises from ‘wilful disobedience’ of court orders. The persistent non-compliance by executives could potentially be charged as civil contempt. The challenges in initiating such proceedings include the defense of partial compliance and the difficulty in holding specific individuals accountable. The courts have previously addressed similar issues, emphasizing the need for accountability.
Conclusion and Recommendations
Non-compliance reaches the threshold of civil contempt when the Supreme Court explicitly rejects a state’s defenses, and the state continues to disregard implementation without a clear compliance timeline. To address this, the Court could implement a time-bound show-cause mechanism requiring non-compliant states to file affidavits detailing their compliance or a roadmap, failing which contempt proceedings would be initiated. Additionally, personal liability should be considered for defaulting officers, and the monitoring role of the Thomas Committee should be revived to ensure ongoing compliance audits.
As a fourth-year law student at Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, Fahas Abdulla highlights that the remedy has not yet been fully attempted, despite the numerous directives and ongoing monitoring.
