On May 12, the Supreme Court of India dismissed a miscellaneous application in the case of Fakir Mamad Suleman Sameja v. Adani Ports and Special Economic Zones. The Court confirmed that the digitally signed order remains the only official and binding expression of its judgment, asserting that the initial dictation given by judges in open court is merely a draft, subject to alterations before it receives final approval in chambers. While doctrinally sound, this decision raises questions about the Court’s commitment to transparency in light of its open-justice jurisprudence.
Case Summary and Supreme Court’s Ruling
On January 27, 2026, a bench comprising Justices J.K. Maheshwari and Atul S. Chandurkar addressed a civil appeal regarding the resumption of gauchar land in Navinal village, Gujarat, which had been allocated to Adani Ports. Observers who watched the proceedings via YouTube perceived that the dictated order maintained a status quo directive and left a pending Public Interest Litigation (PIL) unresolved before the Gujarat High Court. However, the signed order uploaded on February 12 lacked the status quo directive and dismissed the PIL entirely. Consequently, the respondents filed a miscellaneous application, which the Court dismissed, imposing costs of INR 2,000 on each applicant, labeling the application as “a gross abuse of process of law” and an attempt to “undermine the dignity of the Court.”
The Constitutional Question
The applicants cited Article 145(4) of the Indian Constitution, arguing that the dictation in open court constituted the delivery of judgment, which the signed order produced in chambers could not override. The Court, however, emphasized the distinction between the dictation to the court-master and the formal pronouncement of judgment, asserting that dictation serves as a basic framework, a memory aid, rather than a legally binding act. This notion has historical precedence, as seen in Surendra Singh v. State of UP (1953) and Kushalbhai Ratanbhai Rohit v. State of Gujarat (2014), which establish that a judgment is not final until formally signed and sealed.
Implications of Live-Streaming and Open Justice
Despite the clarity in the doctrinal distinction, the Court did not address whether live-streaming the dictation in open court alters the requirements of Article 145(4). In Swapnil Tripathi v. Supreme Court of India (2018), the Court recognized live-streaming as a constitutional necessity, aimed at enhancing public access to justice and reducing dependency on potentially inaccurate secondary reports. This ruling was grounded in the right to access justice under Article 21 and the right to know under Article 19(1)(a). However, the decision in Fakir Mamad raises a structural issue that remains unaddressed: if live-streaming is intended to provide real-time access to judicial proceedings, yet the proceedings do not produce binding legal acts, what is the true value of transparency?
The Court’s Challenge
The core issue is not the validity of the dictation doctrine, which serves an essential institutional purpose, allowing judges to manage extensive dockets efficiently. Rather, the challenge lies in clarifying the constitutional significance of live-streaming dictation. Does the public’s right to witness “proceedings as they unfold,” as stated in Swapnil Tripathi, include observing the creation of a draft, or does it pertain solely to the final, signed order? These questions are critical to maintaining the coherence of the Court’s open justice framework. A transparent judicial system must reconcile the public’s right to view proceedings with the reality that those proceedings do not immediately yield binding judgments.
Kshitij Saruparia is a graduate of NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad.
